Conditional Universal Consistency

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These procedures are “conditionally consistent:†they yield almost as high a time-average payoff as if the player knew the conditional distributions of actions given categories. Moreover, given any alternative procedure, there is a conditionally consistent procedure whose performance is no more than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor. We also discuss cycles, and argue that the time-average of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium.

Date: 1999
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior

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Related works:
Journal Article: Conditional Universal Consistency (1999)
Working Paper: Conditional Universal Consistency (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3204826

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