On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements

David Levine, David Kreps and Drew Fudenberg

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: The philosophy of equilibrium refinements is that the analyst, if he knows things about the structure of the game, can reject some Nash equilibria as unreasonable. The word “know†in the preceding sentence deserves special emphasis. If in a fixed game the analyst can reject a particular equilibrium outcome, but he cannot do so for games arbitrarily “close by,†then he may have second thoughts about rejecting the outcome. We consider several notions of distance between games, and we characterize their implications for the robustness of equilibrium refinements.

Date: 1988
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the robustness of equilibrium refinements (1988)
Working Paper: On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (1988)
Working Paper: On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (1986)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3350444

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