Trade Wars and Trade Talks

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and non-cooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we take a first step towards introducing domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. We study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups. The analysis reveals the determinants of the structure of protection in a non-cooperative trade war and in a cooperative trade agreement.

Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (344)

Published in Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-

Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3450062/Helpman_TradeWars.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Trade Wars and Trade Talks (1995)
Working Paper: Trade Wars and Trade Talks (1993)
Working Paper: Trade Wars and Trade Talks (1993)
Working Paper: Trade Wars and Trade Talks (1993)
Working Paper: Trade Wars and Trade Talks (1993)
Working Paper: Trade Wars and Trade Talks (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3450062

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().