Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?

Date: 1986
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Published in Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-

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