Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions

Jonathan Levin and Susan Athey

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of private information in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. In these auctions, firms bid a per unit price for each timber species. Total bids are computed by multiplying these prices by Forest Service volume estimates, but payments depend on actual volumes harvested. We develop an equilibrium theory for these auctions. We then relate (ex post) data about volume to (ex ante) bids. We show that bidders have private information about volumes of species and use it as predicted by theory. Differences in bidder estimates appear to affect the allocation of tracts, but competition limits information rents.

Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (75)

Published in Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-

Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3612768 ... ationCompetition.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions (2001)
Working Paper: Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions (1999)
Working Paper: Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3612768

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().