Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?

Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder di Mauro

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies. Supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid. On the contrary, according to some measures of corruption, more corrupt governments receive more aid. Also, we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption. In summary, the answer to the question posed in the title is "no."

Date: 2002
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Published in American Economic Review

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? (2002)
Working Paper: Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid? (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:4553011

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