Is Europe Going Too Far?

Romain Wacziarg and Alberto Alesina

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the process of European political integration. We start with a political-economy model of monetary policy, illustrating a general principle: economic integration requires setting up European institutions endowed with the authority to enact Europe-wide policies. On the other hand, when countries can take advantage of scale effects thanks to economic integration, the need for large countries is reduced. Thus increased economic integration reduces the need for political integration in Europe. To reconcile these views, we propose a model for the optimal allocation of prerogatives across levels of government. When the provision of public goods is characterized by cross-border spillovers, some centralization of policies is needed to internalize the externality. These gains from centralization must be traded-off against the costs from imposing the same policies upon heterogeneous groups. The optimal allocation of prerogatives results from this trade-off. Using our model as a benchmark, we analyze the institutional incentives at play for the allocation of political prerogatives in Europe and conclude that the EU has gone too far on most issues.

Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74)

Published in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy

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Related works:
Journal Article: Is Europe going too far? (1999)
Working Paper: Is Europe Going Too Far? (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:4553012

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