The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Drew Fudenberg and Yuichi Yamamoto

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals. It provides a sufficient condition for the folk theorem when the game is irreducible, thus generalizing the results of Dutta (1995) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994). To do this, the paper extends the concept of self-generation (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1990) to “return generation,†which explicitly tracks actions and incentives until the next time the state returns to its current value, and asks that players not wish to deviate given the way their continuation payoffs from the time of this return depend on the public signals that have been observed.

Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory

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Journal Article: The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:8896226

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