Cooperation to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles: A Case of Constrained Innovation

Matthew G. Bunn

Scholarly Articles from Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union posed an unprecedented challenge: to keep tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium to make tens of thousands more, out of hostile hands. In this crisis, small groups of policy entrepreneurs launched major innovations to spur the nuclear complexes of the former rival superpowers to pursue their common interest in securing and dismantling nuclear stockpiles. Billions of dollars have now been spent pursuing these efforts, thousands of bombs’ worth of nuclear materials have been permanently destroyed, and security both for thousands of nuclear weapons and for enough nuclear material for tens of thousands more has been substantially improved.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization

Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3020909 ... clear_Stockpiles.pdf (application/pdf)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3020909 ... clear_Stockpiles.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:hksfac:30209094

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard Kennedy School of Government Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().