Abuse of Dominance by High-Technology Enterprises: A Comparison of U.S. and E.C. Approaches

Frederic Michael Scherer

Scholarly Articles from Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: This paper compares how the United States and the European Community dealt with competition policy challenges by two firms operating at the frontiers of technology: Microsoft and Intel. The U.S. Microsoft case was broadly targeted but largely unsuccessful in implementing remedies once violation was found. The European case was more narrowly focused, failing in its media player unbundling remedy but fighting hard to implement its interoperability information remedy. The European case on Intel was also tightly focused, leading to the highest damages judgment in E.C. competition policy history and a mandate to avoid quantity-linked rebates. The newest U.S. case regarding Intel is only in its early stages, but if its ambitious claim for remedies is sustained, difficult monitoring problems will be faced. The paper ends with critical comments on E.C. adjudication procedures.

Date: 2010
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Published in HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series

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