Cross-Shareholdings, Outside Directors, and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Japan

Naohito Abe () and Taehun Jung

Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: We have analyzed the monitoring role of outside directors in Japan. A detailed classification of each outside director into (1)former bankers; (2)former shareholders; (3)former cross-shareholders; and(4)pure outside directors reveals that only pure outside directors increase the turnover-performance sensitivity of inside directors. That is, we found that the background of each outside director is crucial for his or her role as a monitor.

Date: 2004-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hst:hstdps:d04-38

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