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Property Rights and the Political Organization of Agriculture

Jonathan Conning and James Robinson

No 405, Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College from Hunter College Department of Economics

Abstract: The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how the economic environment determines organizational form under the assumption of stable property rights to land. The political economy literature has modelled the endogenous determination of property rights. In this paper we analyze a general equilibrium model in which the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the distribution of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from agrarian reform, it may be determined in anticipation of this impact. Property rights may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency. The model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts the redistribution of land is chanelled primarily via land sale and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others. We test some implications of the theory using a five-decade panel that traces changes in the extent of tenancy over five decades across fifteen Indian states.

Keywords: Agrarian Organization; Political Economy; Property Rights Reforms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F11 J42 J43 L1 Q12 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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