On the Topological Social Choice Problem

Shmuel Weinberger ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Extending earlier work of Chichilnisky and Heal, we show that any connected space of the homotopy type of a finite complex admitting a continuous symmetric choice function respeting unanimity is contractible for any fixed finite number (>1) of agents. On the other hand, removing the finiteness condition on the homotopy type, we show that there are a number of non-contractible spaces that do admit such choice functions, for any number of agents, and, characterize precisely those spaces.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2002-01
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, vol. 18, pp. 227-250.

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