Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests

Gary Bornstein

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Intergroup conflicts generally involve conflicts of interests within the competing groups as well. This paper outlines a taxonomy of games, called team games, which incorporate the intragroup and intergroup levels of conflict. Its aims are to provide a coherent framework for analyzing the prototypical problems of cooperation and competition that arise within and between groups, and to review an extensive research program which has utilized this framework to study individual and group behavior in the laboratory. Depending on the game's payoff structure, contradictions or conflicts were created between the rational choices at the individual, group, and collective levels -- a generalization of the contradiction between individual and collective rationality occurring in the traditional mixed-motive games. These contradictions were studied so as to identify the theoretical and behavioral conditions that determine which level of rationality prevails.

Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Published in Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2003, vol. 7, pp. 129-145.

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