Uncoupled dynamics cannot lead to Nash equilibrium

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We call a dynamical system uncoupled if the dynamic for each player does not depend on the payoffs of the other players. We show that there are no uncoupled dynamics that are guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium, even when the Nash equilibrium is unique.

Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
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Published in American Economic Review, 2003, vol. 93, pp. 1830-1836.

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