Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations
Ziv Gorodeisky ()
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Abstract:
It has been shown (Hart [2002]) that the backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is the unique stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large, under the assumption that the expected number of mutations per generation is bounded away from zero. Here it is shown that one can dispense with this last condition. In particular, it follows that the backward induction equilibrium is evolutionarily stable for large populations.
Keywords: Evolutionary Dynamics; Evolutionary Stability; Markov Chains; Transition Times; Backward Induction Equilibrium; Large Populations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2003-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Published in Mathematics of Operation Research, 2006, vol. 31, pp. 369-380.
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