Efficient Mechanisms for Multiple Public Goods

Suresh Mutuswami and Eyal Winter ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of public goods. Our analysis differs from the existing literature in allowing for the presence of multiple public goods and in also being “simple.” While both mechanisms ensure efficiency, the payoffs in the first mechanism are asymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents move. The second mechanism corrects for this through a two-stage game where the order of moves in the second stage are randomly determined. The payoffs from the second mechanism correspond to the Shapley value of a well-defined game which summarizes the production opportunities available to coalitions in the economy.

Keywords: public goods; mechanism design; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2002-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2004, vol. 88, pp. 629-644.

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Journal Article: Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods (2004)
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