Bargaining with an Agenda

Barry O'Neill, Dov Samet, Zvi Wiener and Eyal Winter ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, vol. 48, pp. 139-153.

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Journal Article: Bargaining with an agenda (2004)
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