Dissolving a Common Value Partnership in a Repeated 'queto' Game

Paul Schweinzer

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We analyse a common value, alternating ascending bid, first price auction as a repeated game of incomplete information where the bidders hold equal property rights to the object auctioned off. Consequently they can accept (by quitting) or veto any proposed settlement. We characterise the essentially unique, sequentially rational dynamic Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game under incomplete information on one side and discuss its properties.

Keywords: repeated games; incomplete information; common value auctions; partnership dissolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D44 D82 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2003-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp318.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp318.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp318.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp318

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Simkin ().