Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games

Abraham Neyman () and Rann Smorodinsky ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: The asymptotic value, introduced by Kannai in 1966, is an asymptotic approach to the notion of the Shapley value for games with infinitely many players. A vector measure game is a game v where the worth v(S) of a coalition S is a function f of ?(S) where ? is a vector measure. Special classes of vector measure games are the weighted majority games and the two-house weighted majority games where a two-house weighted majority game is a game in which a coalition is winning if and only if it is winning in two given weighted majority games. All weighted majority games have an asymptotic value. However, not all two-house weighted majority games have an asymptotic value. In this paper we prove that the existence of infinitely many atoms with sufficient variety suffice for the existence of the asymptotic value in a general class of nonsmooth vector measure games that includes in particular two-house weighted majority games.

Keywords: asymptotic value; weighted majority game; two-house weighted; majority game; vector measure game; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2003-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Forthcoming in Mathematics of Operations Research

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