On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example

Yair Goldberg ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: The minmax in repeated games with imperfect monitoring can differ from the minmax of those games with perfect monitoring. This can happen when two or more players are able to gain common information known only to themselves, and utilize this information at a later stage. Gossner and Tomala [1] showed that in a class of such games, the minmax is given by a weighted average of the payoffs of two main strategies: one in which the information is gained, and the other in which the information is utilized. While this result is implicit, all examples analyzed to date require a single main strategy in which information is created and utilized simultaneously. We show that two strategies are indeed needed by providing and solving a concrete example of a three-player game.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/Yair345.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/Yair345.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/Yair345.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp345

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Simkin ().