On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo- ration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemi- continuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.

Keywords: NTU games; Mas-Colell bargaining set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2004-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005, vol. 41, pp. 1060-1068.

Downloads: (external link)
http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp360.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp360.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp360.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp360

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Simkin ().