When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?
Robert Aumann and
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This theorem ascribes to all two-person zero-sum games a value–what rational players may expect–and optimal strategies–how they should play to achieve that expectation. Seventyseven years later, strategic game theory has not gotten beyond that initial point, insofar as the basic questions of value and optimal strategies are concerned. Equilibrium theories do not tell players how to play and what to expect; even when there is a unique Nash equilibrium, it it is not at all clear that the players “should” play this equilibrium, nor that they should expect its payoff. Here, we return to square one: abandon all ideas of equilibrium and simply ask, how should rational players play, and what should they expect. We provide answers to both questions, for all n-person games in strategic form.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: When all is said and done, how should you play and what should you expect ? (2005)
Working Paper: When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect ? (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp387
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Simkin ().