Optimal Ties in Contests

Maya Eden ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: I analyze a mechanism design of a tournament in which the principal can strategically enhance the probability of a tie. The principal decides on a ”tie distance” and announces a rule according to which a tie is declared if the difference between the two contestants’ performances is within the tie distance. I show that the contestants’ equilibrium efforts do not depend on the prizes awarded in case of a tie. I find that there are cases in which the optimal mechanism has a positive tie distance.

Keywords: Tournament; Strategic ties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2006-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Ties in Contests (2006)
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