Stochastic Dynamics for the Matching Pennies Game

Ziv Gorodeisky ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We consider stochastic dynamics for the Matching Pennies game, that behave, in expectation, like best-response dynamics (the continuous fictitious play). We prove convergence to the unique equilibrium by extending the result of Benaim and Weibull [2003] on deterministic approximations for stochastic dynamics to the case of discontinuous dynamics - such as the best-reply dynamics.

Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2006-11
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