The Value Of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Uncertain Duration

Abraham Neyman ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: It is known that the value of a zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides need not exist [Aumann Maschler 95]. It is proved that any number between the minmax and the maxmin of the zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on both sides is the value of the long finitely repeated game where players' information about the uncertain number of repetitions is asymmetric.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration (2012)
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