A Measure to compare Matchings in Marriage Markets
Florian Biermann
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Abstract:
In matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion to compare matchings. We argue that this criterion is lacking an economic interpretation: In many circumstances it will neither reflect the expected extent of partner changes, nor will it capture the satisfaction of the players with the matching. As an alternative, we set up two principles which single out a particularly "disruptive" subcollection of blocking pairs. We propose to take the cardinality of that subset as a measure to compare matchings. This cardinality has an economic interpretation: The subset is a justified objection against the given matching according to a bargaining set characterization of the set of stable matchings. We prove multiple properties relevant for a workable measure of comparison. Keywords: Stable marriage problem, Matching, Blocking pair, Instability, Matching comparison, Decentralized market, Bargaining set
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Measure to Compare Matchings in Marriage Markets (2011) 
Working Paper: A Measure to Compare Matchings in Marriage Markets (2011) 
Working Paper: A Measure to compare Matchings in Marriage Markets (2011) 
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