Continuous-time Stochastic Games

Abraham Neyman ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: Every continuous-time stochastic game with finitely many states and actions has a uniform and limiting-average equilibrium payoff.

Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Journal Article: Continuous-time stochastic games (2017)
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