Spectrum Value for Coalitional Games
Ziv Hellman () and
Eyal Winter ()
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Assuming a `spectrum' or ordering on the players of a coalitional game, as in a political spectrum in a parliamentary situation, we consider a variation of the Shapley value in which coalitions may only be formed if they are connected with respect to the spectrum. This results in a naturally asymmetric power index in which positioning along the spectrum is critical. We present both a characterisation of this value by means of properties and combinatoric formulae for calculating it. In simple majority games, the greatest power accrues to `moderate' players who are located neither at the extremes of the spectrum nor in its centre. In supermajority games, power increasingly accrues towards the extremes, and in unaninimity games all power is held by the players at the extreme of the spectrum.
Pages: 19 pages
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Journal Article: Spectrum value for coalitional games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp618
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