Uniqueness of optimal strategies in captain lotto games
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
We consider the class of two-person zero-sum allocation games known as Captain Lotto games (Hart 2014). These are Colonel Blotto type games in which the players have capacity constraints. We show that the players’ optimal strategies are unique in most cases.
Pages: 29 pages
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