Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization
Bezalel Peleg and
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.
Keywords: Feasible elimination procedure; anonymity; Maskin monotonicity; independent blocking; axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
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Journal Article: Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization (2017)
Working Paper: Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp693
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