Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
Bezalel Peleg and
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
A social choice correspondence is self-implementable in strong equilibrium if it is implementable in strong equilibrium by a social choice function selecting from the correspondence itself as a game form. We characterize all social choice correspondences implementable this way by an anonymous social choice function satisfying no veto power, given that the number of agents is large relative to the number of alternatives. It turns out that these are exactly the social choice correspondences resulting from feasible elimination procedures as introduced in Peleg (1978).
Pages: 15 pages
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Working Paper: Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong Equilibrium (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp717
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