Macroeconomic Policy in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union

Oliver Grimm () and Stefan Ried

SFB 649 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649

Abstract: We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both the whole union’s and the country-specific welfare.

Keywords: monetary union; heterogeneities; policy game; simultaneous policy; sequential policy; coordination; discretionary policies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E61 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Working Paper: Macroeconomic Policy in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2007-028

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