Asymmetric information and overeducation
Concetta Mendolicchio (),
Dimitri Paolini () and
Tito Pietra ()
No 201214, IAB Discussion Paper from Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany]
"We consider an economy where production may use labor of two different skill levels. Workers are heterogeneous and, by investing in education, self-select into one of the two skills. Ex-ante, when firms choose their investments in physical capital, they do not know the level of human capital prevailing in the labor market they will be active in. We prove existence and constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria, which are always characterized by overeducation. An increase in total expected surplus can be obtained by shrinking, at the margin, the set of workers investing in high skill. This can be implemented by imposing taxes on the cost of investing in high skill or by imposing a progressive labor earning tax." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))
Keywords: ökonomische Theorie; Humankapital; Bildungsinvestitionen; Gleichgewichtstheorie (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-lab, nep-lma and nep-mic
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Published in: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2012), 27 p.
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Journal Article: Asymmetric Information And Overeducation (2012)
Working Paper: Asymmetric information and overeducation (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iab:iabdpa:201214
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