Competition, Agency and Productivity
Mark Rogers
Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series from Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne
Abstract:
This paper tests a set of hypotheses relating to agency and Schumpeterian views on how competition affects performance. A survey data set of Australian workplaces is used, with the change in labour productivity growth as the dependent variable. The results show strong support for the idea that intense competition raises productivity growth in managerial workplaces, but not in non-managerial workplaces (i.e. where the principal owner also works). Testing the agency theories in more detail we find no evidence that the number of competitors, the price elasticity of demand or a proxy for bankruptcy (pre-tax losses) are the mechanisms behind the process. For non-managerial workplaces the results indicate support for the idea that greater demand uncertainty reduces productivity growth. In contrast, for managerial workplaces greater demand uncertainty tends to raise productivity growth.
JEL-codes: L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2003-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff, nep-ent and nep-ino
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http://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/downloads ... series/wp2003n20.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Competition, agency and productivity (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2003n20
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