Delays in International Patent Application Outcomes

Paul Jensen, Alfons Palangkaraya and Julia Witt
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Julia Witt: Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne

Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series from Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne

Abstract: One component of the duration of pending patents – why applicants choose to delay the examination process – is modelled. We use a matched sample of 9,597 patent applications. Controlling for differences between patent offices, we find evidence of strategic behaviour by applicants.

Keywords: Patent examinations; Patent pendency; Strategic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2007n35

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