Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System

Bernd Hayo and Stefan Voigt

ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: We argue that a higher degree of de facto independence of the legal system from the other government branches as well as public trust in the legal system may reduce the average inflation record of countries through a direct and an indirect channel. The direct channel works by affecting potential output, while the indirect channel helps to increase the de facto independence of the central bank. In the empirical section of the paper, we present evidence in favor of both channels in a sample containing both industrial and Third World countries. A model that contains legal trust in addition to de jure central bank independence, checks and balances within government, and openness can explain 60% of the variation in the logarithm of the inflation rate.

Keywords: Judicial Independence; Legal Trust; Central Bank Independence; Inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-law, nep-mon, nep-reg and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Inflation, Central Bank Independence, and the Legal System (2008)
Working Paper: Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icr:wpicer:02-2005

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