Semiproportional Values for TU Games

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya () and Theo S.H. Driessen ()

ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two- person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure com- posed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.

Keywords: cooperative TU game; value; proportional sharing; probabilistic model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2001-05
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