Discretionary power, rent-seeking and corruption

Enrico Colombatto ()

ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: This article considers corruption as a breach of contract between a principal and an agent. This does not necessarily imply that corruption is immoral, for the nature of the violation actually depends on the features of the underlying contract. In this light, under many circumstances corruption turns out to be a rational and understandable reaction to institutional failures, which are often far from accidental. To this purpose, three different stylized institutional frameworks are analyzed: developed, undeveloped and transition countries. Contrary to the mainstream approach to corruption, it is here argued that the origin, scope and consequences of corruption vary significantly across the different frameworks. Normative conclusions should therefore be adjusted accordingly.

Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2001-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.biblioecon.unito.it/biblioservizi/RePEc/icr/wp2001/EC24-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icr:wpicer:24-2001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research Corso Unione Sovietica, 218bis - 10134 Torino - Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Daniele Pennesi ().