The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch. A Conceptual Framework

Anne van Aaken (anne.van.aaken@uni-hamburg.de), Eli Salzberger (salzberg@research.haifa.ac.il) and Stefan Voigt

ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries – from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared.

Keywords: Separation of Powers; Public Prosecution; Government Offences; Positive Constitutional Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K40 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-law
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/icr/wp2003/Voigt32-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icr:wpicer:32-2003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research Corso Unione Sovietica, 218bis - 10134 Torino - Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Daniele Pennesi (daniele.pennesi@unito.it).