The Separations of powers, the rule of law and economic performance

Suri Ratnapala ()

ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research

Abstract: Markets work best when the rules of the game are stable, property rights are secure and contracts are observed. These conditions are promoted by the rule of law in the classical liberal sense of the supremacy of general laws over public and private authority. Devices such as mixed government and the separation of powers are believed to be conducive to the rule of law. However, the degree of formal separation of powers in a constitution does not always co-relate to rule of law conditions and hence to economic performance. Hence the speculation that the separation of powers is not a necessary condition to the rule of law. The paper argues against such a conclusion by developing an account of the separation of powers that focuses on its methodological thesis in addition to its better known thesis of the diffusion of power.

Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2006-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icr:wpicer:4-2006

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