Elections and the Timing of Devaluations

Ernesto Stein and Jorge Streb ()

No 1302, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank

Abstract: This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for an open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the pre-election period so as to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on closed economies, previous political cycle models had overlooked the influence of elections on the behavior of exchange rates. Voter uncertainty is introduced in two different dimensions. Not only are voters uncertain regarding the competency of the incumbent, but they also ignore the degree to which the incumbent is opportunistic.

Keywords: political budget cycles; devaluations; WP-396; fiscal policy; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Elections and the timing of devaluations (2004)
Working Paper: Elections and the Timing of Devaluations (1999)
Working Paper: Elections and the Timing of Devaluations (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:1302

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