Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?
Cesar Calderon () and
Alberto Chong
No 1557, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank
Abstract:
Using objective institutional historical data we test the link between extent, duration, and transparency in democracies and rent-seeking behavior using time-series and panel data approaches. In this paper we focus on the case of Uruguay, an ethnically homogeneous country. We find three main results. First, democratic regimes are negatively linked with rent-seeking actions. Second, the longer the duration of democracy, the less rent-seeking in a society. Third, legislation enacted more transparently is negatively correlated with rent-seeking behavior. Our results are robust to the use of different econometric methods and basic robustness tests and are consistent with prevailing theory.
Keywords: WP-534 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Working Paper: Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior? (2005) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:1557
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