Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected?: A Model of Strategic Populists

Sebastian Miller

No 3102, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank

Abstract: The existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history. In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office.

Keywords: IDB-WP-248; Outsiders; Populism; Campaign contributions; Inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected? A Model of Strategic Populists (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:3102

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