Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study
Juan-Camilo Cardenas (),
Natalia Candelo Londono (),
Alejandro Gaviria (),
Sandra Polania-Reyes () and
Rajiv Sethi ()
No 3317, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank
This paper uses an experimental field approach to investigate the pro-social preferences and behavior of social services providers and the behavior of potential beneficiaries in Bogota, Colombia. Field experiments were conducted using games including a newly designed Distributive Dictator Game in order to examine traits and mechanisms guiding pro-sociality. Replicating the patterns of previous studies, individuals showed a preference for fair outcomes, positive levels of trust and reciprocity, and willingness to punish unfair outcomes. The results provide evidence that the poor trigger more pro-social behavior from all citizens, including public servants, but the latter display strategic generosity. Additional observations include a bias in favor of women and households with more dependents, but discriminatory behavior against stigmatized groups.
Keywords: discrimination; social services; Distributive Dictator Game; stigmatized groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study (2008)
Working Paper: Discrimination in the provision of social services to the poor: a field experimental study (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:3317
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