Are We All Playing the Same Game?: The Economic Effects of Constitutions Depend on the Degree of Institutionalization

Mariano Tommasi, Carlos Scartascini and German Caruso

No 4612, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank

Abstract: The understanding of the economic effect of formal institutional rules has progressed substantially in recent decades. These formal analyses have tended to take for granted that institutional arenas such as Congress are the places where decision-making takes place. That is a good approximation in some cases (such as many developed countries today) but not in others. If countries differ in how institutionalized their policymaking is, it is possible that the impact of formal political rules on policy outcomes might depend on that. This paper explores that hypothesis and finds that some important claims regarding the impact of constitutions on policy outcomes do not hold for countries in which institutionalization is low. The findings suggest the need to develop a broader class of policymaking models in which the degree to which decision-making follows "the rules" is also endogenized.

Keywords: IDB-WP-237 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D78 H20 H60 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Are we all playing the same game? The economic effects of constitutions depend on the degree of institutionalization (2015)
Working Paper: Are We All Playing the Same Game? The Economic Effects of Constitutions Depend on the Degree of Institutionalization (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:4612

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