Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More?

Kala Krishna (), Sergey Lychagin and Veronica Frisancho

No 8311, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank

Abstract: Placement, both in university and in the civil service, according to performance in competitive exams is the norm in much of the world. Repeat taking of such exams is common despite the private and social costs it imposes. We develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey`s university placement exam. Limiting retaking results in all agents gaining ex-ante, and most gaining expost. This result comes from a general equilibrium effect: retakers crowd the market and impose negative spillovers on others by raising acceptance cutoffs.

Keywords: IDB-WP-758 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: RETAKING IN HIGH STAKES EXAMS: IS LESS MORE? (2018)
Working Paper: Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:8311

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