Transparency and Trust in Government: Evidence from a Survey Experiment
Martín Alessandro,
Bruno Cardinale Lagomarsino,
Carlos Scartascini and
Jerónimo Torrealday
No 9496, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank
Abstract:
Does providing information improve citizens’ perception about government transparency? Does all information matter the same for shaping perceptions about the government? This paper addresses these questions in the context of an online randomized survey experiment conducted in Argentina. Results show that providing information to citizens matters for shaping perceptions about transparency, and the content of the information matters for affecting the evaluation people make about the government. Those who received a “positive” treatment (showing that the government was over-performing on its promises) increased their trust in the government more than those who received a “negative” treatment (showing that the government was underperforming). The evidence highlights that the channel between transparency and trust may be mediated by the performance of the government.
Keywords: Survey experiments; Information; Beliefs: Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C38 C83 C99 D83 D90 H11 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Journal Article: Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment (2021) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:9496
DOI: 10.18235/0001569
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