Internet Interconnection and Network Neutrality
Jay Choi (),
Doh-Shin Jeon () and
Byung-Cheol Kim ()
No 753, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse
We analyze competition between interconnected networks when content is heterogeneous in its sensitivity to delivery quality. In a two-sided market framework, we characterize the equilibrium in a neutral network constrained to offer the same quality and assess the impact of such a constraint vis-à-vis a non-neutral network where Internet service providers (ISPs) are allowed to engage in second degree price discrimination with a menu of quality-price pairs. We find that the merit of net neutrality regulation depends crucially on content providers' business models. More generally, our analysis can be considered as a contribution to the literature on second-degree price discrimination in two-sided platform markets.
JEL-codes: D4 L1 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Internet Interconnection and Network Neutrality (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:26549
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