Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Downsian Dynamics

Didier Laussel (), Michel Le Breton and Dimitrios Xefteris

No 778, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

Abstract: The main purpose of this short paper is to examine how traditional Downsian dynamics (convergence of the parties to the median of the distribution) are altered by the introduction of centrifugal incentives arising from the fact that any motion towards the center induces a lost of votes at the extremes of the electorate. Our analysis provides a new rationale for platform differentiation. It also yields new insights in the case when centripetal incentives are dominant on one side of the political spectrum while centrifugal incentives take over on the other side. This may apply for instance to the 2012 French elections.

Keywords: Electoral Competition; Mixed equilibria; Centrifugal incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Simple Centrifugal Incentives in Downsian Dynamics (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:27233

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